For a couple of years now I have been trying to make sense of the degree of animosity in the debate over how to best promote trans rights. I phrase that very carefully: I have no interest at all in people who aren’t interested in promoting trans people’s rights and nor do the vast majority of people engaged in this often heated discussion. That’s why I have been so puzzled. Why are people who should on paper be allies be at each others’ throats? How can it be, for example, that a lesbian feminist, Kathleen Stock, is being depicted as an agent of conservative, reactionary forces?
As a great believer in the principle of charity, I’m unhappy with any explanation that involves the claim that one side is just plain wrong. But it is impossible that both parties with a real disagreement are equally right. The war in Ukraine has provided an all-too vivid example of the limits of ‘seeming things from the other person’s point of view.’ Where there is a genuine dispute, one side must be wrong.
One of the claims made for philosophy is that it can help us to better see the shape of a problem, even if it can’t solve it. That shape can be seen by focusing on the following claims, which are consistent and I believe should all be accepted.
- People should be able to live according to whichever gender identity they prefer.
- Trans people, who live with a gender identity that doesn’t match their biological sex, should be given full and equal rights.
- Biological sex is real and is not the same as gender identity.
- Sometimes, people must be distinguished by their biological sex and not their gender identity.
Before I say anything more, it should be obvious that someone who agrees with all four of these propositions cannot be called bigoted or transphobic on any reasonable definitions of those terms. They could conceivably be wrong, and their mistake could be harmful for trans people. But that would not make them ill-intentioned, let alone wicked. Still, this set of views is typical of gender-critical feminists who are routinely vilified as being ‘trans-exclusionary’.
So which of these claims is contested? As I’ve said, this debate is not between people who disagree on the first. Nor is it primarily about the the second, although it is easy to think it is. All citizens should have ‘full and equal rights’ but these are not necessarily the identical rights of all other citizens: children, parents, elders, prisoners, the disabled and so on all have slightly different rights, reflecting their different needs. So it is a red herring to simply assert that equal rights for trans women must mean they have the exact same rights as biological females, trans men biological males. That is what needs to be determined.
There are disagreements about the third claim that biological sex is real and is not the same as gender identity, but these are not as central as it sometimes seems. Some, often influenced by Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, argue that biological sex is not real and that male/female is socially constructed gender ‘all the way down’. This is, I think, nonsense. Sexual dimorphism is a basic fact of biology and you can’t even describe sexual reproduction without it. But in a sense it doesn’t matter whether you deny the reality of biological sex or simply argue it is barely relevant and we can structure society without it. The upshot for those who want trans woman or man to mean woman or man, period, is the same: humans should not label people by their chromosomes, genitals or phenotypic sexual features.
On the other side of the debate, more and more people are questioning whether gender identity is real. This is, I think, a mistake. The sceptical doubts concern the fact that gender identity is not rooted in any physical facts and that the only person who can determine their own is the person who has it. So ‘gender identity’ seems to become nothing more than a strong inner feeling without any meaningful criteria for correct application. It also seems a little strange that gender is both a social construct and an indubitably and unquestionably real inner, innate feeling.
I understand the force of these arguments but however we make sense of it, it is just true that many people – though not all – do have a very strong sense of gender identity and that is why some go to such lengths to assert it. If you say it is not real you risk seeming to not understand or even take seriously the lived experience of trans people. If you want to critique the notion – and I think it is ripe for critique – don’t frame that in terms of it not being real.
So the nub of the debate appears to be the fourth claim that sometimes, people must be distinguished by their biological sex and not their gender identity. But even here not many people reject this outright. As I’ve already suggested, many believe that the situations in which it is necessary to distinguish between gender identity and biological sex are very few indeed and in practice don’t matter. That is in part because in each such case you could word the distinction that needs to be made to avoid any mention of sex or gender. Breast and cervical cancer screening programmes, for example, need not be for females, but for people with breasts or cervixes.
It still seems obvious to me that we do need to make some distinctions according to biological sex and that to avoid using the language of male/female would be disingenuous. Women’s sports and safe spaces where women can expect to be separated from people with penises are the two most obvious examples. The latter does not imply that most or even many trans people are predatory would-be rapists. Men have for a long time been rightly excluded from rape and domestic abuse shelters, not because most pose a risk but because it is important to reduce the risk of a rogue abuser of their position to as close to zero as possible and to make the women there feel as comfortable as possible. The exclusion of trans women with penises from certain women-only spaces is not based on a belief that such women are generally dangerous but that a small minority – no higher a proportion than among the cisgender – could be, that it opens the door for abusers who are not genuinely trans to pose as such, and it could make some people feel understandably uncomfortable.
Once again, I want to stress that nothing about this disagreement should be offensive. So why is it? Well, for many it isn’t. Whenever I’ve made mild comments on this in public, someone has always piped up to say that I should just listen to trans people and accept what they say. But there are plenty of trans people who are happy to accept that their gender identity is not the same as their biological sex and don’t feel the need for this fact to be denied.
I’m sure a key part of what makes this difficult is that it is very hard to say the factually correct thing without seeing to imply that a trans woman is not a ‘real’ woman, a trans man not a ‘real’ man. Sophie-Grace Chappell suggested something like this when she compared being a biological parent and an adoptive parent. There is a real difference, she acknowledged, but it is unacceptable to suggest that an adoptive parent is not a real parent. Hence just as we might say ‘adoptive parents are parents, period’, we should say ‘trans women and men are women and men, period.’
The analogy is a good one, but it shows why we do need to make distinctions, not why we should not. Yes, in most circumstances we should treat adoptive and biological parents, trans and cisgender people, without discriminating between them. But there are times when we have to distinguish between them. Adoptive parents should tell their children at some point that they are not heir biological parents, for example, because there are significant differences that implies. Adopted children can have two sets of parents in ways that children raised by their biological parents cannot. Chappell’s analogy actually points to the necessity of sometimes making distinctions, while also showing the inappropriateness of insisting on them when they are not necessary.
So here’s a challenge: can we find ways to make the necessary distinctions between trans and cisgender people without implying that transgender people are not ‘really’ the gender they are? Yes, but only if we are clear that gender and sex are different. It is only because we can openly and honestly recognise a difference between sex and gender that we have the capacity to identify trans people as different without denying the validity of their gender identities. Realism about biological sex is therefore essential if we are to advance trans people’s rights.
(If you haven’t yet listen to my three part discussion between Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Mary Leng, two philosophers who take different views on this, I strongly advise catching up here, here and here.)
News
I’m in conversation with Rob Percival about his book The Meat Paradox for an RSA event on Thursday at 1. It will be available on the RSA’s YouTube channel afterwards. You can read my review of Percival’s book in the Guardian here and further thoughts in a previous Microphilosophy newsletter here.
The Royal Institute of Philosophy is launching its new podcast, which I’m hosting, next week. We say, ‘Since 1925, the Royal Institute of Philosophy has been on a mission to help those interested in and perplexed by the problems of modern life to ask the right questions. Following in that tradition, we bring you Thinking Hard and Slow, a show that asks for your full attention with the promise of rich lectures and discussions. Join host Julian Baggini and leading figures in the world of philosophy as they tackle a range of issues such as: The Philosophy of Green Finance, The Ethics of Anger and Shame, How To Get Good at Bad Emotion, and Decolonizing Philosophy.’
With Easter coming I’m giving the newsletter a two week break. It’s also the ideal time to check out videos and podcasts on my website related to The Godless Gospel. Take your pick from this 10-minute film, the When Belief Dies podcast, this Centre for Public Christianity Life & Faith podcast, or this Wigtown Book Festival interview. And see the bargain book offer below.
A reminder that if you buy books online, you can avoid the tax-dodging giant and buy through my affiliate shop which gives 10% to independent bookshops and 10% to me.
On my radar
I shouldn’t be pointing you towards people who are smarter and more interesting than me, but in the spirit of Paschal sacrifice, I thought I’d tell you about two journalists/commentators I really admire.
It’s a bit mad to recommend a potentially better newsletters than this one but I would be doing you a disservice if I didn’t tell you about Ian Leslie’s The Ruffian. (Note the wordplay in the title.) Ian is disgustingly smart without being arrogant or overconfident and reading his newsletter makes me marvel at just how much he can absorb in a week. He’s a frequent tweeter who will often point you to really interesting other people.
Louise Perry is an excellent writer, especially on issues relating to feminism. She challenges a lot of liberal assumptions about ‘liberation’ and in doing so risks being unfairly labeled a conservative reactionary. She’s also on twitter.
That’s it for this week, and the next two. So until next time, if nothing prevents, thanks for your interest.